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The Federal Housing Administration2
TheModernization Loan Insurance
Program
THE Federal Housing Administration was. established as a
new agency of the federal government when the President
signed the National Housing Act on June 27, 1934. Title I
of this Act provided the main outlines of the modernization
loan insurance program, with which Part I of this study is
exclusively concerned.' The reasons for the establishment
of the modernization loan insurance plan are embodied in
the memorandum submitted to the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency on May 16,. 1934 by the National
Emergency Council:2
(1) "A very substantial impetus to recovery and a sizeable reliev-
ing of the unemployment situation can be accomplished.
Such a program also leaves us with a lasting real 'benefit in
the form of better homes...."
(2)It will also "facilitate the flow of money from its present
sources to the point of need without an exèessive use of
Government financing and the funneling of funds through
'Other parts of the National Housing Act called for the organization of a
system of mutual insurance for mortgages (Title II) and for the establishiuent
of national mortgage associations (Title III). In the first year or so of its
existencethe Federal Ho using Administration concentrateditsattention
chiefly upon the modernization loan insurance plan, but in subsequent years
its emphasis shifted in large measure tothe mutual mortgage insurance
provided for in Title II; more recently the first steps in the organization of
national mortgage associations, as envisaged in Title III, have been taken.
No further mention of tinder Titles II and III will be made in
this study.
2 Hearing before the Committee on Banking and Currency, U. S. Senate, 73rd
Congress, 2nd Session, on S. 3603 (May 16, 1934) pp. 14.15.
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the Federal Government and back out into the market. The
approach is not only commendable from the standpoint of
the National Budget but it is important from the standpoint
of preserving and stimulating the private money market and
private lending institutions so that they can more quickly
assume the burden of normal financial operations."
(3) "The costs of this type of financing have in the past been
excessive. To get these costs down and to control such financ-
ing the scheme ...hasbeen worked Out.
A supplementary aim was expressed later by Federal
Housing Administrator McDonald when he testified before
a congressional committee that "the big thing in this has
been to educate the banks to do this kind of business."3
THE MODERNIZATION LOAN INSURANCE PLAN
The chief provisions of the original modernization loan in-
surance plan, or the modernization credit plan as it is some-
times called in FHA publications, were set forth in Section
2 of Title I (Housing Renovation and Modernization) of the
National Housing Act of
(1) The Administrator was authorized to insure reliable
financial institutions against losses, on loans used to finance
alterations, repaits and improvements upon real property.
(2) For each approved financial institution the insurance
should not exceed 20 percent of the total amount of the loans
advanced for such purpose.
(3) Individual insured loans could not exceed $2,000.
(4) The total liability of the administrator was limited to
$200,000,000.
Several important administrative regulations implemented
the plan. National banks, state banks, trust companies and
8AdministratorStewart G. McDonald, Hearing before a subcommittee of
the U. S. Senate, 74th Congress, 2nd Session, on S. 4212 (March 16, 1936)
p.5.
'Public, No. 479, 73rd Congress, H. R. 9620. Title I and the most important
amendments thereto are reproduced in Appendix A.MODERNIZATION LOAN INSURANCE, FHA 23
building and loan associations belonging to the Federal
Home Loan Bank System were automatically approved,
while finance companies, mortgage companies and other con-
cerns had to be approved individually. Funds could not be
used for the purchase and installation of movable equipment
or machinery, but they could be applied to the improvement
of unimproved real property. The $2,000 limit for indi-
vidual loans was not to include the financing or time pay-
ment charge. Other regulations stipulated that the maturity
of the loan must not exceed five years, that repayment be
made in equal monthly instalments, that the entire time
payment charge could not exceed 9.7 percent per annum true
interest on the net proceeds of the loan, and that a borrower
be a real property owner or the legal equivalent. Notes could
be bought, and sold among approved institutions. Minor
exceptions to some of these regulations were permitted.
Within this framework the insured institutions were free
to follow their own lending policies. The government
charged no premium for the insurance and left to the
lenders almost complete responsibility for, selecting sound
credit risks.
This general plan was in effect from August 1934 until
April 1937. Congress then permitted it to lapse, but revived
it in February In the period 1934-37, however, impor-
tant changes were made in the law. The first of these were
the amendments to the National Housing Act of May '28,'
1935: (1) Loans or credits granted for the purchase and in-
stallation of detachable equipment and machinery were
declared eligible for insurance. (2) Loans or credits of $2,000
to $50,000 were likewise insurable, provided the funds were
6TheFebruary 1938 amendments restored the plan with minor modifications.
July 1939 regulations, in accordance with the June 1939 amendments, stipu-
lated that the insured institution pay to FHA an insurance premium of
3/4of1percent of the net proceeds to borrowei'. Experience tinder the
1938 plan was too slight to warrant statistical analysis and in the present
study it has been omitted from consideration.24 GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
used for the purpose of improving other than single-family
structures: "apartment or multiple family houses, hotels, of-
fices, business or other commercial buildings, hospitals, or-
phanages, colleges, schools, or manufacturing or industrial
plants." There followed a second set of amendments on
April 3, 1936: (1) Loans of $2,000 or less could not be in-
sured if the funds or credits were to be used for the purchase
and installation of detachable machinery and equipment,
and the additions, alterations or repairs. had to be on im-
proved real property. (2) The insurance protection on loans
made from April 1, 1936 through March 31, 1937, when
Title I was to expire, was to be reduced from 20 percent
to 10 percent of the aggregate advance by the insured insti-
tution. (3) Borrowers could be either real property owners
or lessees of "real property under a lease expiring not less
than six months after the maturity of the loan or advance
of credit."6
The legislative and administrative changes just mentioned
affected the type of institution insured, the type of loan
approved, the type of borrower receiving the funds, and
ultimately the collection of the loans. These modifications
of the original provisions are summarized in Table 2.
The plan was designed to function with a minimum of
delay and red tape, and the procedure developed in August
1934 remained essentially unchanged. An approved financial
institution, receiving a contract of insurance from FHA,
could immediately proceed to extend credit in accordance
with the regulations. Actually the credit was rarely trans-
ferred to the borrower in the form of cash. Instead the insti-
tution most commonly paid the amount borrowed directly
°Section 6 was added to Title I on April 17, 1936, to permit loans for the
restoration of real property and equipment destroyed by floods and other
catastrophes. it was repealedin 1938. During the period of its operation
very few loans were made under its provisions and these have been largely







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to the building contractor or to the seller of equipment
with whom the borrower dealt.
The borrower's procedure was equally simple. He merely
filled out on a prescribed form a credit statement in which
he described the uses to which the funds were to be put and
supplied other pertinent data.7 If his statement showed that
the loan complied with the regulations, the bank could
report the transaction to Washington and have its insurance
reserve credited with 20 percent of the net advance (for loans
made after April 1, 1936, 10 percent).
In case of default on instalment payments by the borrower
the insured institution could file a claim for loss as early as
60 days but not later than 13 months after the last payment
of an instalment. Claims could include the net unpaid
amount of funds actually advanced, uncollected earned in-
terest, uncollected late charges, uncollected court costs, at-
torney's fees and a handling fee.8 Once the claim was paid
the borrower became a debtor of the government, which
then endeavored to collect the sum due. It was assumed
that the lending institutions themselves would make strenu-
ous efforts to recover from borrowers in order to prevent
impairment of their insurance reserves with FHA.
It did not take long for the program to get under way.
Rules and regulations were made available on August 10,
1934. Organization of the Washington staff and of the field
staffs in all states was completed by August 15, 1934. Finan-
cial institutions and building materials and equipment firms
were provided with information about the program by cir-
cular letters and by interviews. A better housing campaign,
launched jointly by the National Emergency Council and
7After the plan had been in operation for some time a regulation was
introduced requiring the borrower to sign an additional statement, before
the amount borrowed was paid over to the contractor, to the effect that
the improvements were satisfactory.
8SeeChapter 4, footnote 9, for exact method of calculating claims as pre-
scribed in the FHA regulations.MODERNIZATION LOAN INSURANCE, FHA 27
the Federal Housing Administration, undertook to acquaint
the general public with the plan. This vast publicity enter-
prise continued well into 1935, embracing the cooperative
efforts of thousands of volunteer local committees, advertis-
ing contributions by newspapers, magazines, broadcasters
and motion picture theaters, and canvasses of housing con-
ditions by Emergency Relief Administration workers.
Only the loans insured from August 1934 to April 1937
are considered in this study, since experience under the re-
vived plan has been extremely limited. As is shown in Table
2, which summarizes the legislative changes in Title I of the
National Housing Act, loans of $2,000-50,000, made exclu-
sively for industrial and commercial purposes, were eligible
for insurance after May 1935. These non-consumer loans are
necessarily included in a number of the tabulations used in
this study. They amounted, however, to only 1 percent of
the number of loans insured and to 10 percent of the dollar
volume, and therefore do not impair the consumer char-
acter of the general body of insured loans. Where isolation
of the two classes—notes under $2,000 and notes over $2,000
—is possible, the latter are discussed incidentally for com-
parative purposes, while major attention is devoted to the
smaller loans. Although not all of the loans of $2,000 or less
were used for the improvement of single-family dwellings,
which is here considered an indication of their consumer
orientation, the tabulations which permit the separation of
single-family and other than single-family loans of $2,000
or less show only small differences; hence it seems justifiable
to regard the two classes as more or less homogeneous.
INSTITUTIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE PLAN
Although 11,945 financial institutions had entered into con-
tracts for insurance with FHA by the end of 1934, only
6,433, or slightly more than half of them, actually took28 GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
advantag.e of the scheme by extending insured loans.9 By
far the vast majority of the financial institutions remained
outside the program; only two-fifths of the commercial banks,
about 15 percent of the industrial banking companies, less
than 10 percent of the finance companies, and an even
smaller percentage of the building and loan associations,
savings banks and credit unions in the country as a whole
participated in the plan.
Since almost any reputable financial institution could ob-
tain a contract from FHA, the question arises as to why such
a large proportion failed to accept the government's offer
of free insurance. One explanation is to be found in the
regulations governing the type of borrower and the kind of
property to be improved.10 The definition of property owner-
ship, for example, rendered the plan almost useless for most
credit unions, and the restriction upon the use to which the
loan could be put had a similar effect upon sales finance
companies, especially those specializing in automobile financ-
ing. Moreover, since ordinarily the only security for the
loans was to be the economic capacity of the borrower as
represented by his income, many savings banks and building
and loan associations, which customarily require real estate
mortgage security, may have considered that the risk in-
volved in such character loans would be too great and that
the regulations as to proof of property ownership would
introduce unnecessary complications. Even if eligible insti-
tutions remained undaunted by these restrictions, a large
number, particularly the personal finance companies and
the industrial banking companies, may have decided that
the 9.7 percent maximum annual rate of interest permitted
for insured loans was too low, despite the added protection
they might otherwise have enjoyed from the insurance.
0Theonly available tabulation of institutions approved is that for December
31,1934, published in the First Annual Report of the Federal Housing
Administration, 1934, p. 9.
Table 2 above.MODERNIZATION LOAN INSURANCE, FHA 29
A number of other considerations, more difficult to ap-
praise, may well have caused some institutions to abstain
from participating in the scheme. It seems likely that many
feared that the fairly specific requirements regarding the
loan and the borrower would prove to be a nuisance, if not
actually a threat to customer goodwill. It is possible, too,
that a few balked at participation because FHA was a gov-
ernment enterprise. Others may have anticipated that the
expense involved in the drafting of reports and the extra
bookkeeping would not be counterbalanced by the money
return. Finally, government credit insurance was• new to
American money-lenders, and some of them may have been
suspicious of the plan simply because the service was being
given away.
Let us return now to the 6,433 institutions which did
insure loans with the Federal Housing Administration dur-
ing the period under discussion, for it is with them, with
the notes they insured and with their experience in collect-
ing the loans that this study is chiefly concerned." As Table
3 shows, 90 percent of the lending institutions were com-
mercial banks, almost evenly divided between national banks
on the one hand and state banks and trust companies on the
other. These outlets provided 70 percent of the dollar vol-
ume of loans. Finance companies, frequently subsidiaries
of building materials concerns, comprised only 2 percent of
ByDecember 31, 1934, 3,997 had reported loans; by December 31,1935,
6,082; by December 31, 1936, 6,399; and by March 31, 1937, 6,433. Of the
6,433 institutions which made insured loans up to April 1, 1937, 6,289 came
in under the 20 percent reserve provision; 4,010 of them continued to use
the insurance under the 10 percent reserve prevailing from April 1936 to
April 1937 and an additional 144 joined the plan in that year. At first glance
it might seem that the decline in actively insured institutions was conditioned
by the reduction of the reserve. However, since few institutions used up their
insurance even under the 10 percent reserve, itis more likely that a large
proportion of those which dropped out found that they were not making
enough eligible loans to warrant continuation of the insurance. The insured







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.MODERNIZATION LOAN INSURANCE, FHA 31
the lenders, but furnished 22 percent of the total dollar
volume. Industrial banking companies constituted only 1
percent of the lending institutions and yet accounted for 6
percent of the total volume of notes insured, while build-
ing and loan associations made up nearly 5 percent of the
institutions insured but less than 1 percent of the total dollar
volume. A few savings banks, both stock and mutual, and a
still smaller group of credit unions, mortgage companies,
insurance companies and production credit associations pro-
vided the remaining 1.6 percent of the number of institu-
tions and 1 percent of the dollar volume.'2
Also in Table 3 are shown some striking variations among
the different types of lending institutions with regard to the
average amount each institution loaned under the insurance
scheme. Thus although the average total amount loaned by
all institutions was $87,122 per institution, the average for
finance companies per unit was $829,888 and for industrial
banking companies $421,770. The building and loan asso-
ciations and the credit unions, on the other hand, provided
the smallest averages per institution. The leading position
of the participating finance companies in this respect is to
be attributed to the fact that a large part of their loans
conformed to FHA specifications. Industrial banking com-
panies, which had a relatively large volume, were already
in operation as agencies of consumer credit and a goodly
portion of their business was eligible for FHA insurance,
especially from June 1935 to March 1936 when movable
equipment was included in the FHA list. The small average
for building and loan associations reflects their reliance on
real estate mortgage loans. The average volume per bank
for national banks, although small compared with that for
The relatively large financial institutions made more extensive use of the
insurance than the relatively small; the 3,997 institutions reporting loans
insured by December 31, 1934 represented nearly three-fourths of the corn-
mercial banking assets in the United States but only about one-fourth of
the number of banks.32 GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
finance companies, was almost twice as greatasthe average
for state banks and trust companies. This divergence may
be explained by the fact that larger banks in the highly in-
dustrialized sections of the country, where the modernization
loans were concentrated, are usually national banks.
As Table 4 indicates, the dollar volume of notes insured
was by no means equally distributed among the different
institutions. Of the grand total of 6,433 lending institutions,
as small a number as 596 (9.4 percent) accounted for 84
percent and as few as 64 of the latter (1 percent of the total
number of institutions participating) furnished 60 percent
of the total dollar volume of notes insured. The average
volume per institution for the 64 institutions with the larg-
est volume was over $5,000,000, while the average for the
institutions in the smallest volume group—those with less
than $100,000—was not quite $16,000.13
Some general reasons for the volume concentration may
be offered. Many of the 596 institutions had exceptionally
large resources; many were located in populous regions or
where population was growing rapidly; some had a number
of branches; a few were particularly well prepared to take
advantage of the FHA insurance subsidy; some, seeking new
sources of income, were disposed to make substantial in-
vestments in insured loans.
Thus far we have described the modernization loan pro-
gram, outlined its provisions and summarized the major
features of the institutions which took advantage of them.
The following chapter deals with the principal character-
istics of the loans extended by the insured institutions, and
Chapter 4 analyzes claims paid by FHA to insured institu-
tions.
13The percentage distribution of the dollar volume of notes insured among
the 596 large-volume lending institutions, by type, is as follows: 283 national
banks, 43 percent; 208 state banks (including trust companies and a few
savings banks), 22 percent; 61 finance companies, 26 percent; and 44 "others,"
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